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JOINT VENTURE LAW IN THE SOVIET UNION
I. INTRODUCTION
The era of glasnost' and perestroika2 has brought broad and
sweeping changes to the Soviet Union.3 Major revisions in the Soviet law
concerning joint ventures with Western firms4 promise to benefit the
Soviets, as well as Western businesses eager to acquire access to the
Soviet domestic market.5
While enthusiasm for joint ventures is high, Western businessmen
should note the current hazards of doing business in the Soviet Union.6
These hazards arise, in part, from differences between Soviet and Western
1. Glasnost, or openness, is the term chosen by President Mikhail Gorbachev to signify
his policy of allowing greater political freedoms, particularly in regard to speech and
information. Rogers, Glasnost & Perestroika: An Evaluation of the Gorbachev Revolution
and Its Opportunities for the West, 16 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 209, 209-10 (1988); see
also Nelan, The Year of the People: A Catalyst for Reform from Moscow to Bucharest,
Gorbachev Has Transformed the World, TIME, Jan. 1, 1990, at 46.
2. Perestroika, or restructuring, is the term used to describe Gorbachev's measures to
reform the Soviet state's stagnant centrally planned economy. See Rogers, supra note 1,
at 209-10; see also Nelan, supra note 1, at 46.
3. Rogers, supra note 1, at 209-10. See generally Breslauer, Linking Gorbachev's
Domestic and Foreign Policies, 42 J. INT'L AFF. 267 (1989); Ericson, Soviet Economic
Reforms: The Motivation and Content of Perestroika, 42 J. INT'L AFF. 317 (1989); Lewin,
Perestroika: A New Historic Stage, 42 J. INT'L AFF. 299 (1989).
4. The USSR officially allowed the creation of joint ventures between Soviet and
Western partners in January 1987. Burt, Joint Venture Experience: Observations on the
Business and Legal Challenges, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 435 (1990). At this time,
two separate decrees were passed: a general authorization from the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR entitled Questions Concerning the Establishment in the
Territory of the USSR and the Operation of Joint Ventures, International Amalgamations
and Organizations with the Participation of Soviet and Foreign Organizations, Firms and
Management Bodies, 2 VED. VERKH. Sov. SSSR, item 35 (1987), translated in UNITED
NATIONS, JOINT VENTURES AS A FORM OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION 144-
45 (1989) [hereinafter JOINT VENTURES]; and a decree from the USSR Council of Ministers
entitled The Establishment and Operation of Joint Ventures in the Territory of the USSR
with the Participation of Soviet Organizations and Firms from Capitalist and Developing
Countries, 9 SP SSSR, item 40 (1987), translated in JOINT VENTURES, supra, at 145-52.
5. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & USSR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRY,
GUIDE TO JOINT VENTURES IN THE USSR 3 (1988) [hereinafter JOINT VENTURE GUIDE].
6. Osakwe, The Death of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Investment Policy: A Clinical
Examination of the Soviet Joint Venture Law of 1987, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 9
(1989).
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legal systems,7 and the new legislation's conflicts with existing Soviet
laws.' An additional and perhaps most problematic concern is the
continuous deterioration of the Soviet economy.9 More time is needed to
test the viability of joint ventures and to assess the future stability of the
Soviet marketplace.
11. JOINT VENTURE LAW IN THE USSR
The introduction of communism to Russia, which was brought about
by the Revolution of 1917, effectively ended all previous foreign
investment allowed under the czarist regime. 10  Western business
interests within the Soviet Union were restored partially in March 1921
when Lenin" sought to revitalize the Soviet economy with 'his New
Economic Policy (NEP).' 2 This policy was broadened by the enactment
of the 1923 Law on Concessions, 3 which allowed more foreign partici-
pation in Soviet business. 4 This open market policy, however, was
short lived. In 1930, Stalin 5 outlawed joint ventures with all foreign
firms,' 6 stating that outside control over any part of the Soviet Union was
7. JOINT VENTURE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 5.
8. See Osakwe, supra note 6, at 12.
9. See Watson, Why He Is Failing, NEWSWEEK, June 4, 1990, at 18. President
Gorbachev's reforms are increasingly seen as ineffective and perhaps unworkable. Id.
This view is shared by both the Soviet populace and foreign experts. Id. These
perceptions have created a climate of instability which may lead to Gorbachev's downfall.
Id. Nevertheless, it is still unclear if these naysayers will prove to be correct. Id. at 19.
10. See generally B. DMYTRYSHYN, USSR: A CONCISE HISTORY 64-149 (4th ed. 1984).
11. Vladimir Lenin was the father of Soviet communism and the supreme Soviet ruler
until his death in 1924. See Friedrich, Headed for the Dustheap, TIME, Feb. 19, 1990, at
36-37. For a further discussion of Lenin, see R. PAYNE, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF LENIN
(1964).
12. Comment, Joint Venture Law in the Soviet Union: The 1920s and the 1980s, 9 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 634 (1989). For a discussion of NEP, see B. DMYTRYSHYN, supra
note 10, at 119-24.
13. Comment, supra note 12, at 635.
14. Id. See generally J. QUIGLEY, THE SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLY 35, 47-48
(1974); G. SMITH, SOvIET FOREIGN TRADE 60-63 (1973).
15. From the power struggle resulting upon Lenin's death, Joseph Stalin emerged as the
leader of the USSR. Friedrich, supra note 11, at 37-38. For a discussion of the power
struggle following Lenin's death, see B. DMYTRYSHYN, supra note 10, at 139-45. Stalin
held this position until his death in 1953. Friedrich, supra note 11, at 37.
16. Comment, Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union: A Legal and Economic Perspective,
16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 390, 390 (1975).
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ideologically improper. 7 Foreign direct investment thereafter consisted
only of Industrial Cooperation Agreements ("ICAs"). 1
The Soviets approved joint ventures with other socialist countries by
1983,19 but did not officially discuss partnerships involving Western
investors until 1986.1 This led to the Soviets' January 1987 decree
permitting and outlining procedures for joint ventures with capitalist and
developing countries.2 ' Subsequent amendments in September 19871
and December 1988' further clarified the regulations.
17. G. SMITH, supra note 14, at 60.
18. Recent Developments, Foreign Investment: New Soviet Joint Venture Law, 28
HARv. INT'L L.J. 473, (1987).
Generally, ICAs ... take one of four forms: 1) coproduction and specialization:
both partners produce components for a final product to be assembled by one
partner; technology is usually supplied by one partner, and there is usually an
agreement to market the product in each partner's respective market; 2)
subcontracting: the socialist partner manufactures the product according to the
Western partner's specifications, and delivers the products to the Western
partner; 3) licensing: the Western firm licenses technology to the socialist partner
and payment is made not in the ordinary form of hard currency royalties, but in
products or components resulting from the use of the license; 4) turnkey plants:
the Western partner .sells plant, equipment, and technology to a socialist partner
and is paid in the products of the newly created plant.
Comment, supra note 16, at 391-92; see Berman, Joint Ventures Between United States
Firms and Soviet Economic Organization, 1 INT'L TRADE L.J. 139, 145 (1975-76).
19. Note, Prospects for Western Investment: A Comparison of Joint Venture Laws in the
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and China, 12 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.R. 103, 108 & n.45
(1989) (citing The Edict on the Procedures for Effectuating Activity on the Territory of the
USSR of Joint Economic Organizations of the USSR and Other COMECON Countries,
VED. VERKH. SoV. SSSR, no. 22, item 330 (1983)). CMEA or COMECON was formed
by the socialist nations to promote economic trade between member nations. Id. Its
members include the USSR and the Eastern European nations of Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and Bulgaria. Recent Developments, supra note 18, at 474 n.9. Due to the
recent democratization of Eastern Europe, the alliance has become increasingly irrelevant.
Id. Currently, the majority of the CMEA nations are more interested in economic relations
with Western countries than in relations with one another. Id. On June 28, 1991, the nine
member nations of COMECON formally agreed to disband the organization. Greenhouse,
Soviet Trade Bloc Is Out of Business, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1991, at A3, col. 1.
20. Note, supra note 19, at 108-09.
21. JOINT VENTURES, supra note 4, at 145-52.
22. In September 1987, the USSR Council of Ministers issued an amendment to the
January 1987 decree entitled Additional Measures to Improve the Country's External
Economic Management in the New Conditions of Economic Management, 49 SP SSSR, no.
9, item 40 (1987), translated in JOINT VENTURES, supra note 4, at 179-83.
23. In December 1988, the USSR Council of Ministers issued an additional decree
amending the January 1987 law, this decree was entitled Further Development of the
1990]
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A. The Soviet Shift Towards Joint Ventures
Inspiring perestroika is the Soviet government's persistent belief that
the traditional centrally planned economy has not provided a level of
development on par with industrialized capitalist countries.' The
scarcity of consumer goods and modern technology is concrete proof that
the Soviet Union has fallen behind developed Western nations.
Gorbachev' sees joint ventures as a "major instrument" for implement-
ing economic reform.'
In addressing these economic shortfalls, the January 1987 decree
specifically stipulates that the USSR ministries and agencies pursue the
following objectives:
* to satisfy more fully national requirements in certain types of
industrial products, raw materials, and foodstuffs;
e to attract to the Soviet national economy the best in foreign
processes, technologies and management, as well as additional
material and financial resources;
* to further develop the country's export capability; [and]
" to reduce unnecessary imports."'
For Western businesses, the Soviet Union represents a store of
abundant natural resources28 and, like the People's Republic of China in
1979, a tempting, untapped consumer market. 9 With a Soviet partner,
a Western business is better able to assess the needs of the Soviet market
Foreign Economic Activity of State, Cooperative and Other Public Enterprises, Associations
and Organizations, 2 SP SSSR, item 7 (1988), translated in Theroux & George, Joint
Ventures in the Soviet Union: Law and Practice, in A NEW LOOK AT DOING BUSINESS
WITH THE SOVIET UNION 1989, at 221,289-303 (E. Theroux ed. 1989) [hereinafter A NEW
LOOK].
24. Ericson, supra note 3; see Bialer, Domestic and International Factors in. the
Formation of Gorbachev's Reforms, 42 J. INT'L AFP. 283, 286 (1989).
25. Mikhail Gorbachev is currently President of the USSR and General Secretary of the
Communist Party. See Friedrich, supra note 11, at 37. He ascended to power in 1985 and
subsequently instituted a policy of massive political and economic reforms. Id.
26. Osakwe, supra note 6, at 4.
27. JOINT VENTURE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 19. A related motivation is the Soviet
Union's declining birthrate, particularly in the Russian Republic. Note, supra note 19, at
104. This decline is likely to cause a labor shortage in the coming years. Id.
28. Note, supra note 19, at 103. These resources include natural gas, coal and
industrial metal. Id. at 103 n.7.
29. Carpenter & Smith, U.S.-Soviet Joint Ventures: A New Opening in the East, 43
Bus. LAW. 79, 80 (1987); see Note, supra note 19, at 103.
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while keeping tabs on Soviet economic and technological developments. '
Also, there is the businessman's lure "of doing deals that haven't been
done before."31
Through the economic push of joint ventures, perestroika may bring
more general benefits to the Western world, including a decrease in
defense spending, stable relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union, and greater social and cultural interactions among citizens of the
two nations. 32
B. Set-up Procedures for Joint Ventures
There are three phases of development in establishing a joint venture:
discussion, contract negotiations and official registration.3  Prior to
commencing this process, the Western partner should first establish that
the potential Soviet partner is legally authorized to operate in the chosen
business of the proposed joint venture and is, in fact, a recognized legal
entity . ' Upon obtaining this verification of the Soviet partner's legal
status, the Western venturer can enter into initial discussions. Successful
discussions with the prospective Soviet partner and the relevant govern-
ment officials lead first to the signing of a protocol or letter of intent.35
It is wise, at this stage, for each of the venturers to gain an understanding
of their respective responsibilities and of the general goals of the joint
venture.3
The partners must next prepare a feasibility study as part of the
official approval process. 7 This study can further solidify each partner's
30. JOINT VENTURE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 19.
31. Kampelman, Making Money with the Soviets, Wall St. J., July 12, 1989, at A16,
col. 3.
32. Rogers, supra note 1, at 239; see Breslauer, supra note 3, at 278-79.
33. Theroux & George, supra note 23, at 239-40; see JOINT VENTURE GUIDE, supra
note 5, at 20-24. For an outline on how to set up a joint venture, see generally Dean, The
Process of Closing the Deal, in A NEW LOOK, supra note 23, at 95.
34. See Theroux & George, supra note 23, at 241-42. On October 27, 1990, a
presidential decree greatly relaxed this requirement. Decrees Devalue Ruble: Allow 100%
Subsidiaries, BUS. E. EUR., Nov. 5, 1990 [hereinafter Decrees Devalue Ruble]. The new
law allows joint ventures with Soviet legal entities and with Soviet natural persons. Id.
While this change increases the potential partner pool, the Western joint venturer should
take great care in assuring that the Soviet partner has adequate financial resources and
sufficient access to supplies. Making a Joint Venture in the Soviet Union, BUS. INT'L
MONEY REP., June 11, 1990.
35. Theroux & George, supra note 23, at 239-40.
36. Id. at 240-41.
37. Id. at 242.
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position in regard to the enterprise and allow for a more complete
examination of the venture's difficulties.38  Next, the venturers must
negotiate and prepare the necessary documents (i.e. the joint venture
agreement, the joint venture statute and all ancillary contracts).3 9 In
devising these documents, the negotiators must be sure to fulfill all the
requirements of the 1987 Joint Venture Law.' These documents then
must be submitted to "a 'higher administrative organ' exercising control
over the Soviet partner" for approval 1 and to the USSR Ministry of
Finance for registration.42 Finally, the venture is announced to the
Soviet press.43
The Western partner, however, should not be lulled into a false sense
of security by what appears to be an orderly set-up procedure. There are
several deficiencies and inconsistencies in the Soviet legislation that must
be clarified during the contract negotiation phase.
III. LEGAL CONCERNS FOR WESTERN BUSINESSES
A. Contractual Questions
Under the 1987 Joint Venture Law, the joint venture is considered a
juridical person subject to Soviet law." This raises a number of
concerns because the Soviet Union has only the January 1987 decree and
its amendments to regulate joint ventures; there is no broader corporate
law infrastructure.45  There are no guidelines for writing a valid
contract' and no explanation of the legal consequences of signing the
agreement prior to registration with the authorities.47 Also, it is unclear
at what point in the development process the joint venture agreement takes
effect. "
38. Id.
39. Id. at 240, 243.
40. Id. at 243-44.
41. Id. at 245.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 240.
44. JOINT VENTURE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 25.
45. Id.
46. Osakwe, supra note 6, at 103.
47. Id. at 104.
48. Id. at 103; see Address by Prof. N. Vosnesenskaya, Presentation to the Conference
on Negotiating and Implementing Joint Ventures and Other Business Arrangements in the
USSR (Feb. 13, 1990) [hereinafter Vosnesenskaya addressl (on file at the office of the
N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.).
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In addition to the joint venture decrees, the venture partners are bound
by Soviet tax law, labor law and property law, unless they are exempt by
international treaties to which the USSR is party.' The joint venture
contract itself is an additional source of legal guidelinesA"
The foreign partner should be concerned particularly with article 1 of
the Joint Venture decree, which allows the Soviets to control joint
ventures by enacting "other legislative acts of the USSR and Union
Republics."" The freedom to enact other laws could provide the Soviets
with a powerful tool for wielding control over foreign investors.52
Moreover, in instances where the laws enacted by a republic conflict with
federal guidelines, it is unclear which takes precedence. 3
B. Dispute Settlement
More concern arises upon examination of dispute settlement guide-
lines. Under article 20 of the 1987 decree, "any dispute arising in the
course of the operation of the joint venture may be adjudicated in Soviet
courts or . . . before the Soviet Arbitration Court. "I It is unclear if this
procedure is mandatory, however, because the Soviet conflicts of law
doctrine states that the "rights and duties of parties to foreign trade
transactions are defined by the law of the place where they were
concluded, unless the parties otherwise provide by their agreement.""
The Soviet conflicts of law doctrine appears to allow the joint venture
partners to utilize the law of a foreign country to regulate their relation-
ship.' For example, the American Trade Consortium in 1988 persuaded
its Soviet partner to arbitrate disputes in Swedish courts.57 It remains to
49. Hines, Dispute Resolution and Choice of Law in U.S. -Soviet Trade, in A NEW
LOOK, supra note 23, at 125, 136.
50. Osakwe, supra note 6, at 55.
51. Id.
52. Osakwe, supra note 6, at 55.
53. Address by Prof. W. Butler, Presentation to the Conference on Negotiating and
Implementing Joint Ventures and Other Business Arrangements in the USSR (Feb. 13,
1990) (on file at the office of the N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.).
54. Osakwe, supra note 6, at 64.
55. Hines, supra note 49, at 137.
56. Id. Swedish law appears to be a good choice for joint ventures because it seems
reliable to Western nations and appears acceptable to the Soviets. Id. Swedish law,
however, does contain a trap for the unwary. Id. If the joint venture agreement does not
specifically render Swedish choice-of-law doctrines inapplicable, such principles could
result in the unwanted implementation of Soviet law. Id. at 138.
57. Osakwe, supra note 6, at 64 n.237.
19901
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be seen, however, if Swedish law always will be acceptable or if the
Soviets will try to enforce article 20.58
C. Liability
As in many Western industrial democracies, corporate officers in the
USSR are liable under criminal, civil and administrative law.-' Under
criminal law, an officer is accountable for various felonies, including such
"economic crimes' as failure to meet quality standards.' Violating a
Soviet citizen's labor rights also carries criminal and civil penalties."1
The joint venture partners' liability to each other is an even more
pressing issue because Soviet law is once again unclear on this. point.62
Under article 18 of the Joint Venture decree, the joint venture is liable for
all its own obligations, but not those of its individual partners;' the
partners, in turn, are not liable for the obligations of the joint venture."
However, article 10, which does not set any liability limit for the
partners,0 appears to be in conflict with article 18.' For example, it
states that the joint venture's authorized fund, formed from the partners'
contributions, can be "replenished by using profits derived from the
business operation of the joint venture and, if necessary, through
additional contributions by the partners."67 Consequently, the Western
partner may be required to contribute assets greater than its equity share,
clearly an outcome to be avoided."
D. Ternination and Liquidation Procedures
Traditionally, Eastern European joint ventures are terminated after a
specified time period set by the joint venture law itself or by agreement
of the parties.' Under the Joint Venture decree, the partners can extend
58. Hines, supra note 49, at 137 n.10.
59. JOINT VENTURE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 28.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Osakwe, supra note 6, at 103.
63. Id. at 104.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. JOINT VENTURES, supra note 4, at 147.
67. Id.
68. Osakwe, supra note 6, at 104-05.
69. Note, Glasnost: Joint Ventures Now Permitted in the Soviet Union, 3 FLA. INT'L
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that time period if they wish, to avoid untimely dissolution of a successful
business;'7 likewise, they can terminate the venture by mutual agreement
at any time.7 Also, the Soviet government can liquidate the enterprise
if it is no longer fulfilling the goals of its charter.' The latter provision
should concern the Western partner because it neglects to state the extent
of departure from the venture's stated goals necessary to trigger a
dissolution proceeding. I Since there is no existing procedure for
appealing this involuntary termination, the foreign partner should negotiate
for as much flexibility as possible in the project objectives.74
E. Transferability of Shares
The wary Western venturer also should pay close attention to the 1987
Joint Venture Law's provisions on share transfers. Specifically, article 16
of the law expressly states that "[p]artners in a joint venture shall have the
right to assign, by common consent, their shares ... to third parties [and
that such] assignment is effected with an endorsement . . . of the USSR
Council of Ministers."75 Furthermore, article 16 contains the following
language: "Soviet partners have the priority right to acquire shares of
foreign partners.' Some commentators feel that these conditions (i.e.,
mutual consent, Ministry approval and a Soviet priority right) allow the
Soviets to retain too much power over assignability. r Under this view,
the foreign partner could be "forced to sell its shares to the Soviet
participant at a lower price than would be available from a third party,
and . . . the requirement of two approvals and a Soviet priority right
L.J. 125, 144-45 (1987). For a general account of Eastern European joint ventures, see
generally Scriven, Joint Venture Legislation in Eastern Europe: A Practical Guide, 21
HARv. INT'L L.J. 633 (1980); Tiefenbrun, Joint Ventures in the USSR, Eastern Europe,
and the People's Republic of China as of December 1989, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
667 (1989).
70. Note, supra note 69, at 145.
71. JOINT VENTURE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 32.
72. Id.
73. Note, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law: Analysis, Issues and Approaches for the
American Investor, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BuS. 851, 884 (1987).
74. JOINT VENTURE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 32. This is particularly important as it
appears that the Soviets take the doctrine of ultra vires very seriously. Address by R.
Testan, Presentation to the Conference on Negotiating and Implementing Joint Ventures and
Other Business Arrangements in the USSR (Feb. 13, 1990) (on file at the office of the
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.).
75. JOINT VENTURES, supra note 4, at 147.
76. Id.
77. See Note, supra note 73, at 885.
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[could be] used to force such a sale.""8 A provision in the December
1988 amendment allows transferability rights to be written in the joint
venture agreement; it remains unclear, however, if this provision overrides
the earlier requirements of the original 1987 decree when there is a
conflict. 9
To avoid these and related problems, the Western partner must use
great care in devising the dissolution passages of the joint venture
agreement. In addition to the above concerns, the partner must be sure
to include a procedure for valuating assets and liabilities.'° Other issues
to be covered in the agreement include the transfer of hard currency, the
sale of real estate, profit repatriation arrangements and share and loss
apportioning. 1
F. Property Rights
Historically, Eastern European joint venture laws have given either all
property rights to the joint venture itself or have allowed the parties to
maintain ownership of individual contributions.' Under article 17 of the
1987 decree, the joint venture retains all property rights and is protected
in the same manner as Soviet state organizations,' including protection
for copyrights and patents." Furthermore, only specific government
organizations are permitted to levy claims against the partnership, and the
administrative requisition or confiscation of property is prohibited."
While these provisions appear to provide the venture with a certain
amount of protection, technology remains a concern that is not covered by
Soviet law.' At this moment, the Western partner should pay careful
attention to protecting confidentiality and technology in the agreement;
however, a new Soviet intellectual property law may soon eliminate the
need for this precaution. 7
78. Id. at 886 (citing J. DOBKIN, J. BURT & S. REYNOLDS, A WESTERN PRACTITION-
ER'S VIEW OF THE SOVIEr JOINT VENTURE LAW 16 (1987)).
79. Osakwe, supra note 6, at 90.
80. Note, supra note 69, at 146.
81. JOINT VENTURE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 32.
82. Note, supra note 69, at 135.
83. Note, supra note 19, at 113.
84. Note, supra note 69, at 135.
85. JOINT VENTURE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 31.
86. Theroux & George, supra note 23, at 249.
87. Id.
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G. Capital Contributions
As in the other Eastern Bloc nations, the Soviet joint venture law
permits many types of capital contributions."' Because the ruble is not
a convertible currency on the world market, the Soviet contribution likely
will consist of mineral and property rights," while the foreign partner
will provide hard currency, technology or both.'
By referring to world market prices, the 1987 decree allows the
partners, through mutual agreement, to appraise their contributions in
either rubles or hard currency. 9' Evaluating non-cash contributions may
be one of the most laborious portions of the bargaining process.'
Specifically, the value of Soviet real estate and natural resources will be
difficult to assess because the Soviets traditionally have appraised them
below market value by Western standards.' Likewise, no common
pricing standard exists to valuate the Western partner's "know-how. " '
Despite these difficulties, methods do exist for appraising each
partner's contributed assets.95 The Western partner can submit evidence
of prior sales and valuations (particularly sales in the East Bloc), sales of
comparable companies, production costs, the value of licensing similar
technology, and the cost of producing commensurate technology in the
USSR.9 Also as a starting point, the partners can agree on either an
exchange rate or a value for the Soviet partner's contribution.'
Therefore, with careful negotiating, it appears that the valuation problems
are surmountable.
H. Profits
The ruble's inconvertibility is a major obstacle for both Soviets and
Westerners, because both partners want the venture to earn money that
can be spent in global markets." The Western investor's principal
88. Note, supra note 69, at 136-37.
89. Comment, supra note 12, at 645.
90. Id.
91. JOINT VENTURE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 22.
92. Theroux .& George, supra note 23, at 246.
93. Comment, supra note 12, at 645-46.
94. Id. at 646.
95. Theroux & George, supra note 23, at 247.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Note, supra note 19, at 110. The Soviets' need for hard currency began with
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objective, however, is to repatriate profits,' while the Soviet investor's
main motivation is to increase the government's hard currency supply by
keeping profits. 1" With this aim in mind, the Soviets have devised a
law to retain hard currency by requiring the Westerner to follow a
complicated procedure for repatriation. 10
Although the right to repatriate profits is guaranteed by the joint
venture legislation,1°2 the Western partner can collect only hard currency
profits through sales to hard currency markets.'" Although there are
stores in the USSR that sell products for hard currency," those sales
reach only a small percentage of the Soviet domestic market because the
average citizen does not possess hard currency. 0 5 In other words, the
foreign investor cannot expect to repatriate profits through sales to the
Soviet domestic market."
The difficulty of earning spendable profits in the USSR limits the
appeal of joint ventures, but they are still the easiest way to acquire access
to the vast Soviet domestic market. 10 7  Exporting, therefore, is a
burdensome but necessary tool for the Western investor who wants to earn
hard currency while reaching Soviet consumers.' °8
The joint venture can earn hard currency directly by developing
Western export markets for its product;'"9 otherwise, the joint venture
can negotiate a counter-trade deal with an outside Soviet manufacturer and
earn hard currency by selling that product to the West." For example,
the first United States joint venture partner, Combustion Engineering, sells
processing equipment and computer software to Soviet refineries,"' and
the decline of oil prices in the 1980s; 75% to 80% of Soviet export revenue was derived
from oil and gas. Recent Developments, supra note 18, at 479.
99. JOINT VENTURE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 40.
100. See Note, supra note 19, at 110.
101. Bost, The 1987 Soviet Joint Venture Law: New Possibilities for Cooperation and
Growth in East-West Relations, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 581, 587 (1989).
102. Note, supra note 69, at 139.
103. Id.
104. See Theroux & George, supra note 23, at 266. Both Pepsico and McDonald's
intend to open some restaurants in the USSR that will accept hard currency only. Id.
105. See id.
106. Note, supra note 69, at 140.
107. See Osakwe, supra note 6, at 30.
108. See Theroux & George, supra note 23, at 266.
109. Id. at 265.
110. Id. at 266-67; see Bost, supra note 101, at 590-91.
111. Copetas, Perestroika's Yankee Partner, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1989, § 6
(Magazine), at 20; see Therout & George, supra note 23, at 266.
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in return, the company receives payment in Soviet-produced petrochemi-
cals, which it sells to the West for hard currency. 12
One obstacle to counter-trade, however, is the scarcity of Soviet
commodities exportable to Western markets."' For example, the
product may not meet Western quality standards; 14 if it does, the Soviet
manufacturer may choose to market the product abroad itself, avoiding the
joint venture as a "middle-man."" t5  The Soviet manufacturer most
likely will accept a countertrade deal. Consequently, the Western joint
venture partner has superior access to hard currency markets. 116
If the joint venture earns profits both domestically in rubles and
abroad in hard currency, the Western partner may contract to receive a
disproportionate share of the hard currency profits. 7  Because this
method departs from the Soviet aim of acquiring foreign currency, it is
likely to be possible only for the short-term."1
The Soviets have not been indifferent to the problems caused by the
ruble's inconvertibility. They have expressed a willingness to allow large
Western investors, like the American Trade Consortium, to negotiate a
special ruble exchange rate. 9  The Soviets also have considered
implementing a special gold-backed ruble that would be convertible into
Western currencies." In addition, Soviet officials have stated that
Moscow's foreign currency auction, formed in 1989 for Soviet state
enterprises and organizations, will be open to joint ventures in 1990.211
112. Copetas, supra note I 11, at 20.
113. Theroux & George, supra note 23, at 267.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Carey, The Soviet Joint Venture Laws: Their Provisions and Purposes, in A NEW
Look, supra note 23, at 83, 88. For a discussion of the American Trade Consortium, see
Clines, Soviets and 6 U.S. Concerns Sign Trade Pact, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1989, at D4,
col. 3.
120. Soviet Union Considering Ruble to Lift Trade, Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 1989, at A18,
col. 4; see Fisher, When a Firm Unreels Secrets of Soviet Joint Venture, Wall St. J., Aug.
28, 1989, at Al, col. 4. In addition, on October 27, 1990, presidential decree established
a new commercial exchange rate for the ruble. Trade and Payments: Ruble, Foreign
Investment, Moves, Trade, Tariff, COUNTRY REP., Nov. 20, 1990 [hereinafter Trade and
Payments].
121. See Bids for Dollars by Soviets, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1989, at 42, col. 4. A
foreign exchange auction open to cooperatives and joint ventures was held on October 9,
1990. Trade and Payments, supra note 120. Although the turnover at that auction was less
than that at the November 9, 1989 auction, the auctions are now becoming more frequent.
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Finally, a new convertible currency, other than the ruble, may be created
for use in four proposed special economic zones (SEZs).'"
Without these schemes either for earning hard currency or overcoming
the ruble's inconvertibility, Western businesses may be forced to leave the
USSR's vast domestic market untapped.
L Taxation
The taxation of joint ventures is governed by the joint venture
legislation and separate decrees of the USSR Supreme Soviet."z  The
Joint Venture decree subjects most joint ventures to a blanket 30% tax on
profits." The law also imposes an additional 20% tax on all profits
transferred abroad; this regulation is designed to serve as an incentive
to reinvest in the joint venture."
The joint venture law also outlines other tax-related provisions,
including procedures for the joint venture to compute its own tax, as
Id. The dollar rate at the October 9 auction reached as high as Rb. 22.6. Id.
122. Theroux, Special Economic Zones in the USSR: Legal and Practical Issues, in A
NEW LOOK, supra note 23, at 59, 72. The Soviets have designated Nakhodka, Vyborg,
and Novgorod as sites for these SEZs. Business News: Special Economic Zones, Joint
Ventures, Foreign Deals, COUNTRY REP., June 19, 1990. The Soviets, however, have
been slow to implement these zones. Id. Nevertheless, in November 1990, the Russian
Republic passed regulations specifying Nakhodka as the first Soviet free trade zone.
Torbert, First Soviet Free Zone Will Give Firms Access to Pacific Basin Markets, E. ASIAN
EXECUTIVE REP., Mar. 15, 1991, at 9.
123. Osakwe, supra note 6, at 71.
124. JOINT VENTURES, supra note 4, at 150. Under the Law of the USSR on Taxes for
Enterprises, Associations and Organizations adopted by the Supreme Soviet on June 14,
1990, joint ventures with less than 30% foreign ownerships are subject to a tax rate of
45%. New Soviet Tax Code Means MNCs Should Rethink Tax Planning, Bus. INT'L
MONEY REP., July 16, 1990 [hereinafter New Soviet Tax Code]. Under this new law, a
joint venture can deduct interest paid on bank loans and some indirect labor costs and can
carry forward a five-year net operating loss. Id.
125. JOINT VENTURES, supra note 4, at 151. The new tax code has changed the tax rate
on profit distribution from 20% to 15%. New Soviet Tax Code, supra note 124. Also, a
20% withholding tax was added on interest, rents, royalties and dividends. Id. This tax,
however, may be reduced by double taxation treaties. Id. This tax code also adds some
new taxes which are not favorable to joint venturers. New Corporate Tax Regs Good and
Bad for Western JV Partners, BUS. INT'L MONEY REP., July 16, 1990 [hereinafter New
Corporate Tax Regs]. Specifically, the new law adds a super profit tax that imposes
exorbitant rates: 80% for the first 10% above a unspecified threshold amount and 90%
thereafter. Id. In addition, a new turnover tax will be imposed on output that will range
from 10% to 30%. Id.
126. Note, supra note 69, at 143.
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required. 2 7  Payment schedules and late penalties are established,"
as well as the venture's right to appeal unsatisfactory tax collection
procedures.'" The law further allows the Ministry of Finance to
decrease the profit tax percentage or exempt the joint venture from taxes
altogether.30
Initially, the legislation granted a tax exemption during the joint
venture's first two years of activity.'"' A second taxation decree
amended this to a two-year exemption, beginning only upon receipt of
profits. 3 2 This change benefits the Western partner because a venture
may not generate any profits for its first ten years.' Notwithstanding
the complications of the June 1990 tax law, the tax structure appears fair
and shows a Soviet willingness to be open to negotiations. Nevertheless,
the Western joint venturer should do a comprehensive case by case tax
planning analysis.
IV. OPERATIONAL CONCERNS FOR WESTERN BUSINESSES
A. Corporate Decisionmaking
Under the 1987 decree, at least 51 % of the joint venture had to be
owned by the Soviet partner.' Western control was limited further by
a provision that the joint venture's chairman of the board and general
director both be Soviet citizens. 35  Western investors were unwilling
to be minority partners in joint ventures requiring significant amounts of
their technological expertise. '3
The December 1988 amendment, however, modified the requirements;
the Western partner could then hold up to 99% of the venture, 37 and
127. Osakwe, supra note 6, at 75. For a discussion of computing taxes, see generally
Theroux & George, supra note 23, at 255-56.
128. Osakwe, supra note 6, at 75-76.
129. Id. at 76.
130. Note, supra note 73, at 870.
131. Note, supra note 19, at 116.
132. Id. Under the June 14 legislation, this two-year tax break was eliminated for
service and energy extraction joint ventures registered after December 1990. New
Corporate Tax Regs, supra note 125.
133. Osakwe, supra note 6, at 73.
134. JOINT VENTURE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 33.
135. Id.
136. Vaase, Perestroika and Market Socialism: The Effects of Communism's Slow Thaw
on East-West Economic Relations, 9 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 213, 247 (1988).
137. Osakwe, supra note 6, at 88. This requirement was changed further in October
1990]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
foreign nationals can fill the top executive positions. 138  While these
changes appear to lessen the Soviets' potential control over the Western
partner, an additional provision in the December 1988 amendment seems
to grant the Soviets greater control. The power of both the board
chairman and CEO is lessened by a provision requiring the venture's
major operational questions be decided by a unanimous vote of the entire
board. s Unanimous voting protects the minority shareholder, whether
Western or Soviet, because each board member has veto power."' Of
further concern to Western investors is the absence of a procedure for
removing ineffectual directors.141 This problem may be solved by
including a provision for removal procedures in the joint venture contract.
B. Labor Decisions
A difficulty that consistently has affected foreign investments in
Eastern Bloc countries is supervising and motivating a local work force
traditionally unrewarded for productivity. 42 Under the 1987 decree, the
majority of a joint venture's employees had to be Soviets, and the joint
venture, therefore, was subject to the stringent requirements of Soviet
labor law. 43
Because these laws provided no mechanism for rewarding or
punishing employees based on productivity, new mechanisms were written
in the December 1988 amendment to the joint venture legislation.'"
The December 1988 amendment states that all "questions of hiring and
discharging (employees), the form and amount of wages, as well as
material incentives in Soviet rubles for the workers of a joint venture are
decided by the joint venture.""' This new provision seems to allow the
enterprise to set its own employment policy, regardless of its legality
1990. Decrees Devalue Ruble, supra note 34. The new law allows 100% foreign-owned
subsidiaries. Id.
138. Osakwe, supra note 6, at 88.
139. Id. This problem will not occur with wholly-owned subsidiaries. Id.
140. Id. at 88-89.
141. Note, supra note 19, at 114.
142. Note, supra note 69, at 132; see Osakwe, supra note 6, at 32 n.72.
143. Note, supra note 19, at 114-15. Soviet law requires collective bargaining
agreements with the relevant trade unions, a minimum wage, fixed work hours, vacation
time, social security and insurance. Id.; see Osakwe, supra note 6, at 93-94.
144. See Note, supra note 69, at 133.
145. Theroux & George, supra note 23, at 300-01.
[Vol. I11
JOINT VENTURE LAW IN THE USSR
under long established Soviet labor law." At the moment, this provi-
sion violates the Soviet Constitution; as such, its validity is question-
able. 147
The status of non-Soviet workers is an additional concern for joint
ventures. The 1987 decree appears to envision very few non-Soviet
employees working in the Soviet Union. 1" The joint ventures must pay
foreign workers in rubles, 49 and the foreign workers, in turn, must pay
Soviet income tax and social security."' These requirements represent
the Soviet desire to minimize the number of foreign workers"' and may
cause additional financial concerns for the foreign partner.
C. Product Quality
Chronic shortages and a lack of competition have created expectations
of low product quality among Soviet consumers.1"2 The joint venture's
product, however, must meet Western quality standards because the
Western partner's hard currency earnings depend on the product's
marketability abroad. 5 3 Also, a Western partner will not want to lend
its trade name to an inferior product."1
At the same time, however, the Western partner will not want to
commit itself to excessive financial outlays merely to boost quality
standards. 55 For example, not every Westerner can afford to invest as
deeply as McDonald's, which spent $50,000,000 to bring in its own
supplies and production equipment for one Moscow restaurant. "
146. Osakwe, supra note 6, at 89.
147. See id.; Vosnescnskaya address, supra note 48. Professor Vosnesenskaya believes
that the amendment causes no conflict since as a decree of the Supreme Soviet, it has the
power to override prior laws as far as they apply to joint ventures. Id. A prudent joint
venturer, however, would be wise to await official confirmation of this view. Id. Also,
the joint venturer should remain aware of a new minimum wage policy and social security
contributions. Wages and Employment Conditions, BUS. INT'L FORECASTING, Nov. 1,
1990.
148. Note, supra note 69, at 133.
149. Id. at 134.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. Note, supra note 73, at 875.
153. Id. at 875-76.
154. Id. at 876.
155. See id.
156. See Keller, Of Famous Arches, Beeg Meks and Rubles, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28,
1990, at AI, col. 2.
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D. Access to Supplies
Access to supplies in the USSR is tied strongly to product quality.
Under the centrally-planned economy, the USSR State Committee for
Supplies (Gosnab) allocates all resources available to manufacturers.
157
In November 1988, an amendment to the Gosnab decree of June 1987
allowed the joint venture to purchase supplies directly from Soviet
producers with either rubles or hard currency.15s
Purchasing supplies still remains difficult, however, because joint
ventures have no priority and manufacturers have little left to sell after
filling orders for state plans.' 59 Access to supplies is hindered further
by existing inadequacies in the Soviet transportation system."W
Importation is an alternate source of supplies, 6' and a joint venture
may import materials either directly or through a Soviet Foreign Trade
Organization (FTO). 62 Payment, however, must be made in convertible
currency.'" The desirability of imports is further reduced by the
imposition of customs duties."
E. Price Setting
Serious pricing inconsistencies are created by the ruble's nonconverti-
bility. " The joint venture law allows joint venturers to use world
market prices as a model when negotiating with suppliers and custom-
ers. " This standard, however, does not consider the inappropriateness
of world prices in the Soviet market, where the prices of consumer goods
remain artificially low due to government subsidies.167 Pricing strategies
must be carefully detailed in the joint venture agreement." Therefore,
157. See Theroux & George, supra note 23, at 254.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 255.
160. See Note, supra note 69, at 138.
161. JOINT VENTURE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 36.
162. Id. See generally Rabinovitch, The Procedure for Signing with Soviet Foreign
Trade Organizations, 22 INT'L LAW. 143 (1988).
163. JOINT VENTURE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 36.
164. Theroux & George, supra note 23, at 256:
165. Note, supra note 73, at 863.
166. JOINT VENTURE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 36.
167. See Carpenter & Smith, supra note 29, at 88.
168. Id.
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the Western partner must set a price that is competitive on the world
market without being undercut on the Soviet domestic market.169
V. CONCLUSION
Because Soviet legislation allowing joint ventures is only five-years
old, it is still too early to predict solidly the true viability of foreign-Soviet
business partnerships. One thing that remains clear is that the Soviet
Government truly desires improved business relations with the West."7°
The Soviets appear willing to adjust legislation to better suit a foreign
partner's interests.'
Soviet flexibility is evidenced specifically by the amendments to the
original Joint Venture decree, which removed provisions perceived by
wary Western investors as prohibitive. In addition, the Soviets are
considering other measures to ease access to their domestic market,
including devaluing the ruble," granting foreigners access to the
newly-created Soviet foreign exchange auction"2 and creating special
economic zones modeled after those in the People's Republic of Chi-
na.
174
Western interest in joint ventures should continue in the coming years
as the Soviet legislation becomes increasingly accommodating and
thorough. Businesses choosing to pursue joint ventures now, however,
must be careful to tailor and document each aspect of the agreement.' 75
Furthermore, the prospective investor must remember that the future
of a joint venture may depend ultimately upon the success of political and
169. See Theroux & George, supra note 23, at 255.
170. Osakwe, supra note 6, at 100.
171. Id. at 101.
172. Gumbel, Soviets to Devalue Ruble by 50%, Alter Tariffs to Boost Economy, Wall
St. J., Dec. 12, 1988, at A9, col. i.
173. Copetas, supra note I11, at 42.
174. See Theroux, supra note 122, at 72; Gumbel, Soviets Planning Economic Zones
To Draw More Foreign Investment, Wall St. J., May 2, 1989, at A3, col. 1.
175. Toop, Practical Aspects of Initiating Contact, Submitting Proposals and
Negotiating Joint Venture Agreements in the USSR, in A NEW LOOK, supra note 23, at
109, 123. It appears that Western firms are increasingly deciding to pursue joint ventures.
Id. By January 1, 1990, the number of registered ventures surpassed 1300. See 0.
Kocherga, Presentation to the Conference on Negotiating and Implementing Joint Ventures
and Other Business Arrangements in the USSR (Feb. 13, 1990) (on file at the office of the
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.); see also Pear, Chevron and Soviets to Work Toward
Oil Venture, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1990, at A13, col. 1. But see Berg, Business Wary of
Gorbachev Pitch, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1990, at DI, col. 3.
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economic reform within the Soviet Union. 76 Currently, the centralized
government is threatened by increasingly powerful nationalistic movements
in more than one half of the USSR's fifteen republics. " Hence, there
is growing uncertainty and pessimism among the Soviet citizenry
regarding Gorbachev's reform process and its likelihood for success.""
Nevertheless, it is important to realize that joint ventures represent
historic opportunities to unite the East and West in ways unthinkable
during the cold war era."9 This in itself justifies the continuing efforts
of both sides to make joint ventures a success.
Nicole M. Houri
176. Comment, supra note 12, at 656.
177. Watson, supra note 9, at 20. Leading the charge to independence, Lithuania
declared its independence on March II, 1990. Id. Estonia and Latvia followed with less
confrontational moves. Id. Gorbachev reacted harshly to all three challenges. Id.
Additionally, the Ukraine, Moldavia, Georgia and Azerbaijan present potential problems
for Moscow. Id. The Russian Republic also presents difficulty for Gorbachev because of
Boris Yeltsin's recent winning election bid for the presidency of the Republic. See Clines,
In Moscow, Yeltsin Has a Sutnit to Himself, N.Y. Times, § 4 (The Week in Review), at
1.
178. Keller, Gorbachev's And-Magic, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1989, at At, col. 5; see
Watson, supra note 9, at 19. Panic buying swept across Moscow recently in response to
an economic reform proposal. Anderson, Too Little and Too Late?, NEWSWEEK, June 4,
1990, at 22.
179. Bost, supra note 101, at 599.
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